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NOTES
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF UNDERWRITING AGREEMENTS-

In order to supply its needs for funds the modern corporation must
resort to the financier or investment banker to market those securities
that Will bring in the necessary capital. The corporation, however,
needs the money for specific purposes and cannot afford to risk the
vagaries of the financial markets, but wishes to insure its receiving
the money by a stipulated date even though security values have decreased between the offering date and the date that the subscription
list is closed. Consequently, it resorts to that instrumentality of corporate financing known as the underwriting agreement.'
Unfortunately, the term "underwriting" does not have a fixed
meaning either in the field of corporation finance or that of corporation law, but is loosely applied to a variety of transactions which may
with greater aptness be described by more appropriate terms.2 It is
necessary, therefore, to distinguish those agreements the legal consequences of which are customarily called "underwritings" from those
which create some other form of legal relationship.
An underwriting agreement has been well defined as an agreement, made before corporate shares or bonds are brought before the
public, that in the event of the public's not taking all of the shares at
the price offered, or the proportion mentioned in the agreement, the
underwriter will take the balance at the same price less his underwriting commission. This type of contract does not establish a shareholding relationship, but is a contract to purchase shares in the future
if the shareholders or the public do not subscribe to the entire offering.'Underwriting occurs generally at one of four periods in the history of a
corporation's existence: (I) sale of securities of a new enterprise during its
promotion stage; (2) well established corporation wishing to raise additional
capital for corporate purposes; (3) refunding of outstanding obligations; (4)

reorganizations.

GERSTENBERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEIENT
(1924) 349; CONYNGTON & BENNETT, CORPORATION PROCEDURE (1927) 840.
' CONYNGTON, BENNETT & PINKERTON, COPORATION PROCEDURE (1922)

843: "It is, in fact, often difficult to distinguish in practice between the underwriting of a block of securities and its purchase. Even when a single banking
house takes over outright a complete security issue and pays the corporation an
agreed price, the transaction is commonly referred to as an underwriting."
'Fraser v. Home Telephone Co., 91 Wash. 253, 257, 157 Pac. 692, 694
(1916) ; International Products Co. v. Estate of Vail, 97 Vt. 318, '323, 123 Atl.
194, 196 (1924); Ex parte Audain, 42 Ch. D. I, 6 (1889); BALLANTINE, MAN-

UAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1930) §§ 32, 303; 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1917) §§ 442, 443; I MACHEN, CORPORATIONS
(1908) §419; Masslich, Financing a New Corporate Enterprise (1910) 5 ILL.

L. REV. 79, 76.

'Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 195 Mass. 242, 254, 81 N. E. 306, 310: "It
is one thing to agree with a promoter to apply for a certain proportion of the
shares of a new company not taken by the public; it is quite another thing
actually to become a shareholder in the new company for the number of shares
so ascertained. In the first case the underwriter can refuse to become a member
(941)
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The corporation may itself offer to sell its securities, the underwriting
syndicate standing in the background to insure the success of the sale,'
or the syndicate, in addition to the underwriting, may make
the offer6
ing on behalf of the corporation for a selling commission.
A second type of transaction to which the name "underwriting" is
applied occurs where the underwriting syndicate effects the purchase
of the securities from the corporation, and then arranges to sell the
issue either through its own membership or through a separate selling
syndicate which is formed.7 From a legal standpoint this sort of contract is not an underwriting at all but is a creation of the securities
and sale to the syndicate. s The responsibilities of the syndicate members are not contingent upon a public offering but are fixed immediately by the agreement itself.
While the syndicate form of corporate financing is used in practically every offering of any magnitude, there are surprisingly few
decisions involving the construction of underwriting agreements.
There are several reasons for this dearth of cases on the subject. In
the first place, underwritings are confined in the United States to
investment bankers and not thrown open to public investors. Conof the company in pursuance of his contract with the promoter. If he does refuse to do so, he is liable to the promoter for any damage which he, the promoter, may have sustained from that breach of contract. But the underwriter
may prefer paying damages to becoming a member and so liable to pay the
amount due in respect of the shares in question." BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 32; I FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 443. In Busch v. StrombergCarlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 226 Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) the court stated

the rule of damages for breach of an underwriting contract to be as follows:
The corporation could either retain the shares and bonds and sue for damages
for the failure to perform, or he cofuld deliver them to the underwriter, or into
court on his refusal to receive them, and then recover the purchase price. Plaintiff did the latter in this case and he recovered the unpaid purchase price.
' This procedure is now uncommon except where a corporation offers its
shareholders the right to subscribe to new shares of the corporation, the underwriters insuring the success of the offering. CONYNGTON, BENNETT & PINxERTON, op. cit. supra note 2, 842.

'There are manifest advantages to the corporation of syndicate underwriting: (I)the syndicate manager advises as to the type of securities to be issued;
(2) the corporation is sure to get the money when needed; (3) the corporation's
credit is maintained, as the syndicate maintains the price of the company's securities; (4)the syndicate manager is likely to watch over the corporation and
guide it in order to maintain his own reputation; (5) a syndicate sale insures a
wide geographical distribution and therefore saves them from future adverse
money market influences.

GERSTENBERG,

op. cit. supra note I, 369.

present day underwriting is conducted on the basis of an unconditional purchase by the underwriters. CONYNGTON & BENNETT, op. cit. supra
note I, 84o. For a general treatment of the various kinds of syndicate agreenients see DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 381; GERSTENBERG, op. cit. supra note 6, 347.
sI FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 444; MEAI, CORPORATION FINANCE
'Most

(1920)

158: "The difference between underwriting and subscription is that in

underwriting the securities underwritten by the banker are offered for sale by
the corporation through the banker, and in subscription, the securities are purchased by the banker and offered by him to his customers as sound investments."
'DEWING, op. cit. supra note 7, 401.

NOTES

sequently, the underwriters are persons of financial responsibility who
meet their obligations promptly without litigation rather than take the
In the second
risk of losing their most valuable asset, their credit.'
place, underwriting agreements are as a rule carefully drawn and set
out the legal relations of the parties. In the third place, the cases arise
on suits against the underwriters, not on suits by the underwriters.
Since the syndicate agrees to take up those shares which the public
does not take, if the offered amount is subscribed to, the syndicate does
not have to take any securities under the agreement, and if the total
amount has not been subscribed, market conditions are usually such
that the underwriters are not anxious to perform their obligations,
while the corporation seeks to hold them to their agreement.
So many various combinations of terms are practicable that it is
impossible to make any generalizations as to the legal effects of underwriting agreements. In every case it is essential to scrutinize quite
carefully the transaction entered into by the parties. If it imposes
upon them an absolute duty to take a certain number of shares, it is a
subscription contract and subject to the incidents of a contract for the
present creation of shares." Where, however, the duty to take shares
arises only after a public offering, and the agreement is to take up
those shares which the public does not subscribe to by a certain date,
who have entered into an agreement
the promisors are underwriters
2
to subscribe in the future.'
In an attempt to ascertain the agreement of the parties, the courts
will look behind the terms pointing to an underwriting to determine
whether the contract is one for the present creation of shares or one
for the future creation of shares. The recent cases of Positype Corporation v. Flowers13 and Positype Corporation v. Mahin,'1 which
were suits on the same contract, indicate the scrutiny that the courts
give to the transaction in order to determine the legal relationship
created by the instrument. In these agreements the defendants had
agreed in an instrument entitled "Underwriting Agreement" to subscribe and pay for a fixed number of shares of a corporation to be
formed. 15 The syndicate manager was authorized to offer the shares
for sale to the public, but the subscriber could withdraw his proportion
ia Supra note 9. If a banker failed to perform his obligations, he would be
offered no further opportunity to participate in future underwritings, which are
normally quite profitable.
Ihnfra note 17.
z BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 32. For an analysis of the decisions
concerning the creation of shares in the future, see Frey, Post-Incorporation
Subscriptions and Other Cmtracts to Create Shares at a Future Time (1929)
77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 75o.
1a36 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 7th, i93o).
1432 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
'The agreement is printed in 36 F. (2d) at 618: "We, the undersigned,
each for himself . . . agree with each other . . . to subscribe and pay
for First Preferred Stock . . . and Common Stock . . . in the amounts
set opposite our respective signatures . .
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by giving notice and paying for the shares so withdrawn. Plaintiff
corporation brought an action for breach of this subscription contract.
Defendants denied that they were subscribers but declared that they
were only underwriters and that certain conditions had not been complied with. The court rejected this defense and held the defendants
liable as pre-incorporation subscribers, whose duty to pay the agreed
sum was established when the corporation after it came into existence
accepted the subscriptions.1 '
In Positype Corporationv. Flowers the court accurately summarized the difference between a subscription and an underwriting in these
words:
"The first paragraph in Flowers' contract created an unqualified obligation, not to take what was unsold to the public, but to
pay the amount designated. . . The essential difference between a subscription contract and an underwriting agreement lies
in the fact that in the latter the signers obligate themselves to
take the shares which the public do not purchase. In the subscription agreement the signers agreed absolutely to take the number
of shares designated." 17
Where the persons who claim to be underwriters are in reality
subscribers, their legal relations to the corporation are similar to those
of the ordinary subscriber to corporate securities. In such cases the
legal characteristics of the transaction have been fairly well settled by
the decisions. Where, however, the agreement is an underwriting
agreement in the strict sense of the term different results follow.
Under the practice prevalent in England an inquiry into the
nature of the contract between the parties is unnecessary. It has been
the custom there for the underwriter to empower the promoter or
some one else to subscribe for a certain number of shares on behalf
of the underwriter, the number to be reduced pro rata by the number
of shares taken up by the public.1 8 In such cases the courts have held
that this authority amounts to an agency coupled with an interest and
therefore can not be revoked by the grantor of the power.1 9 Thus,
6Nebraska Chicory Co. v. Lednicky, 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245 (1907);
Sanders v. Barnaby, 166 App. Div. 274, '51 N. Y. Supp. 58o (1915); see Clarksburg Land Co. v. Davis, 77 W. Va. 70, 73, 86 S. E. 929, 93o (1915); I THomPSON, CoRaRATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 595; Lukens, The Withdrawal and Acceptance of Pre-IncorporationSubscriptions to Stock (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv.

423, 424, which explains the theories regarding the nature of pre-incorporation
subscriptions.

' Positype Corporation v. Flowers, supra note 13, at 618; see Electric
Welding Co. v. Prince, supra note 4, at 254, 81 N. E. at 3io; (924) 8 MINN.
L. Ray. 618.
"Note (1928) 28 COL L. REv. 634, 637.
"9Carmichael's Case, [1896] 2 Ch. 643; Pole's Case, [1920] 1 Ch. 582.

NOTES

when the agent enters the principal's name on the books of the company as a shareholder, the latter can be made to pay the full subscription price of the shares, even though the subscription was entered after
an attempted revocation of the agent's authority.2
Despite the fact that this practice carries out the intention of the
parties in the usual case and precludes an inquiry into the nature of
the contract entered into and labelled "Underwriting Agreement", the
practice has not been common in the United States. 2 Therefore, in
any case involving an agreement whereby a syndicate has agreed to
take such shares as the public does not subscribe to, or to apply for a
number of shares which were to be allotted only if the general public
should fail to take up the whole number offered for public subscription,
it is necessary to ascertain the legal relations that ensue.
As in any contract, the conditions precedent stipulated in the contract must have been met before an action can be maintained on the
underwriting agreement.2 2 Once the conditions requisite to liability
do exist, there is still present an inquiry into the nature of the agreement and its legal incidents which distinguish the underwriting
agreement from a transaction resulting in the immediate creation of
shares. One of the problems that arises is the question of whether a
payment by persons dealing with the underwriters to the latter becomes
funds of the corporation. In a suit against a corporation to recover
money paid for securities of the corporation to one who held himself
out as an underwriter of its securities, the plaintiff contended that the
underwriter was an agent of the corporation. The court rejected this
contention and ruled that an underwriter was not an agent as a matter
of law. 3 The underwriter is acting for himself and not for the corporation in selling securities which he has underwritten since the
Carmichael's Case, supra note 19.
Note (1928) 28 Cor. L. Rtv. 634, 638.

'Ormerod's

Case, [1894]

2

Ch. Div. 474. In this case the underwriters

agreed to subscribe or find responsible subscribers for a number of shares in the
company to be proportionately reduced in case the shares were partially subscribed for by the public. The court held that a request to the underwriters to
subscribe or find responsible subscribers was a condition precedent to their
being under liability to be treated as shareholders. In Electric Welding Co. v.
Prince, supra note 4, the defendants agreed to apply for a number of shares in
the plaintiff company which were to be allotted and paid for only if the public
should fail to take the whole offering. In the event of their failing to make application they agreed to accept the allotment which may be made against such
application. The promoters without calling on the defendants to apply for their
proportionate part of the shares not taken up, delivered to plaintiff the application for shares that defendants had signed and allotments were made on the
basis of these applications. The court held that the promoter had no authority
to make the applications without first calling upon them to apply for their respective portions of the shares not taken, but held the defendants to be liable on
the ground that their failure to repudiate the allotment barred them from
repudiating their status as registered shareholders.
' Fraser v. Home Telephone Co., supra note 3.
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shares he sells relieves him to that
extent from his obligation to take
24
up the shares of the corporation.
The recent case of In re Danville Hotel Co. 25 illustrates another
aspect of this problem. There a trustee in bankruptcy of the hotel
company asserted a claim to the money in the hands of the underwriters who had assumed full responsibility for the sale of the bonds,
and had agreed to pay over the proceeds, to supervise construction, and
to make disbursements of the proceeds on vouchers for materialmen.
The court refused to permit the trustee of the company to recover the
funds as assets of the bankrupt's estate because the agreement provided
that the company should do certain things before the money should be
paid to it, or for its use. This it had failed to do on account of its
financial inability which resulted in bankruptcy. Thus, the funds in
the hands of the underwriters were not funds of the corporation but
were funds supplied for a specific purpose, and it was the duty of the
underwriters to the subscribers to advance the money only after the
conditions stipulated in the contract were fulfilled.2"
Another characteristic of the responsibility of the underwriter
that distinguishes his relation to the corporation from that of a subscriber is that of his duty to pay the corporation in the case of its
insolvency. Where a person ordinarily subscribes to the bonds of a
corporation, and the corporation becomes insolvent before the time
that the subscription price is to become payable, the subscriber is not
required to take up any of the bonds.27 The insolvency of the corporation would relieve him, as the corporation promises to furnish the
bond of a solvent corporation and not that of a corporation that is
insolvent.28 In the case of an underwriting of the same bonds, however, the insolvency of the corporation is no defense since the underwriting was effected solely for the purpose of securing money for the
corporation regardless of its financial condition, and unless the parties
agree that insolvency shall effect a discharge the underwriter is still
liable on his underwriting agreement. 29
"' It is a usual provisien in underwriting agreements that to the extent that
the shares are sold to others, the underwriters shall be relieved of their underwritings pro rata in the proportion to which the amounts of their respective
underwritings bear to the total amount underwritten.
'38 F. (2d) io (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
IIbid. i: "While an underwriter may in some respects be the agent of the
issuer of the bonds, yet, when the agent is to retain a portion of the money
until a prior incumbrance-is discharged, he does this for, and in so doing is the
agent of the owner of the bonds, who alone is interested in having the discharge
before he parts with the money . . . Caldwell & Co. was acting as agent for
the bondholders and not of the hotel company. As such agent it was bound to
disburse such proceeds strictly in accordance with the directions imposed by the
underwriting agreement. A failure to do this would have rendered it liable to
its principal."
I MACHEN, op. cit supra note 3, § 440; 2 ibid. § 1721.
Eastern Tube Co. v. Harrison, 14o Fed. 519 (E. D. Pa. 195o) 519, 525.
Eastern Tube Co. v. Harrison, supra note 28; Busch v. Stromberg-Carlson
Telephone Mfg. Co., 217 Fed. 328 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).

NOTES

The same distinction exists in the case of share subscriptions.
Where a person contracts with a corporation for the future creation
of shares, aside from any equities that may exist in favor of creditors,
insolvency of the corporation relieves the contracting party from his
liability to the corporation, 30 as distinguished from a transaction resulting in the immediate creation of shares where insolvency would be no
defense.3' The underwriter's obligation, however, should not be defeated by insolvency since the underwriter agrees to furnish the money
or pay for the shares he has underwritten at a definite time to insure
the corporation that the needed funds would be available. Furthermore, in many cases the underwriting agreement is delivered to the
corporation or a syndicate manager for the very purpose of enabling
the corporation to assign its claim against the underwriters as collateral
security for a loan.
Another type of case in which the nature of an underwriting
agreement is revealed is that of Stewart v. Miller,32 where in an action
to foreclose a mortgage the defendant contended that his agreement
with the underwriter of mortgage bonds was void as usurious because
the discount from their face value at which the bonds were issued
amounted to more than the legal rate of interest. The court rejected
this contention on the ground that an underwriting was not a loan and
therefore not within the scope of the usury statutes. While this
appears to be the only case in which a usury statute was asserted as a
bar to an action on an agreement of this nature, the decision is a sound
one. An underwriter is doing more than lending money. He is performing a service in providing a type of insurance 33 whose value can
not be measured by the legal rate of interest since it depends upon the
amount of risk involved.
It is generally provided in underwriting agreements that all, or at
least a fixed portion, of the issue be underwritten before the obligation
of the underwriters is to arise. Where there is no provision of this
sort, each underwriter is liable pro rata to the amount of his subscription even though the entire issue of the security has not been underwritten. 34 This result is inescapable since the contract creates a
relationship between the corporation and each promisor and the courts
should not write a condition precedent into the contract where the
parties did not insert it as an express term in the agreement.
While the underwriting agreement is likely to remain in vogue as
an aid to corporate financing, its legal incidents are not likely to find
their way into American case law at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In

"Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N. V. 737 (1926) ; Frey, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 777.
'Frey, ibid.
I61 Ga. gig, 132 S. E. 535 (19z26).
DovING, op. cit. supra note 7, 406.
'Knickerbocker

Trust Co. v. Davis, 143 Fed. 587 (C. C. D. N. J. i9o6);

cf. Jermyn v. Searing, 225 N. Y. 525, 122 N. E. 7o6 (igig).
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the final analysis, the ultimate solution of any legal problems connected
with underwriting agreements resolves itself into a matter of construction of a financial document and the ascertainment of the intent
of the parties in the light of corporate practice and procedure.
S. H.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SUBJECT AND THE MEASURE OF
TAXATION-GOVERN MENTAL INSTRUATENTALITYv DOCTRINE-The

doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland,1 that federal instrumentalities are
immune from state taxation, is a restriction on the state taxing power

imposed for the purpose of preserving to the federal government freedom to carry out the powers and duties committed to it by the Constitution.

In furtherance of the same purpose later cases held that a

state tax on securities of the federal government,2 or upon the value
which was contributed to property by such securities 3 could not be
sustained. The exigencies of the Civil War caused states to seek
legislative devices for obtaining revenue from sources other than those
already heavily taxed. Though one effort miscarried, 4 two legislatures did achieve their object. 5 In three cases decided by the same
Court at the same time a distinction was definitely evolved-that while
14 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1839) (declared invalid, as imposing a tax on the
Bank of the United States, a state statute entitled "An Act to impose a Tax on
all Banks or Branches thereof in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the
Legislature").
'Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829) (held invalid an ordinance providing that certain property shall be subject to taxation
including stock of the United States).
'Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620 (U. S. 1862) (declared invalid a city commission's computation of a general property tax which
included federal securities in assessing a state bank's capital at its actual
worth).
'Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200 (U. S. 1865). A N. Y. tax on capital
stock of banks assessed at actual value was amended in 1863 to read that all
banks "shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their
capital stock"; held, that deduction must be allowed for the amount of capital
invested in federal securities.
Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (U. S.1867) (sustained, without deduction for amount invested in securities of the national government, enactment that savings banks in Connecticut shall pay annually "a sum equal to
three-fourths of one per cent. on the total amount of deposits").
Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611 (U. S.1867) (upheld,
without deduction for amount invested in federal securities, an act to levy taxes
"on depositors" which required that each bank pay a percentage "on the average
amount of its deposits" for six months prior to date of payment).
Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 (U. S.1867) (sustained inclusion of amount invested in federal securities, where statute required corporations having a capital stock divided into shares to pay a tax upon the excess of
the market value of all such stock over the value of its real estate and machinery).

NOTES

a tax is invalid when imposed on federal instrumentalities or on value
contributed by them, a tax is valid when imposed on a taxable privilege
and merely measured by value accruing from immune instrumentalities." In each of these cases, three justices dissented on the theory
that the tax was in fact an the nontaxable property, and not on the
franchise or privilege. It is not a mere coincidence that sixty-four
years later, in the recent case of Educational Fils Corp. v. Ward,7
three justices again refused to sustain a tax for the same reason; the
distinction has not often found the Court in accord upon its application-born in a divided court, it perpetuates the division. Though the
distinction has never been repudiated, it has been applied in a manner
which this note proposes to examine for the purpose of testing its
present value.3
The early cases stress two reasons for drawing the distinction between the subject and the measure of taxation: it is only just to
require corporations to graduate their tax payments according to the
value of the privileges granted and the extent of their exercise;" such
distinction is necessary to provide the States with sufficient revenue.' 0
Having drawn the distinction, the Court made a formally logical application of it: In Society for Savings v. Coite 11 it was emphasized that
the wording of the statute did not refer to the nontaxable element as
the subject of the tax, but rather as the measure; and the Court dwelt
at length upon the fact that the tax was not assessed and collected
through the same channels as property taxes. In Provident Institution v. Massachusetts," the Court added that interpretation placed on
the character of the tax by the courts of the taxing State, which had
already construed the tax as constitutional, should be regarded as "conclusive". But the main consideration, common to these decisions and
to Hamilton Company v. Massachusetts,"s was the absence of any
necessary relation between the measure of the tax and the actual value
of the nontaxable element. The leading case of Home Insurance Co.
v'. New York I4 merely followed these decisions, the Court doing no
more than to quote from them at length.
'Supra note 5.
'51 Sup. Ct. I7O (1931).
'As to cases in which the measure of taxation included value derived from
interstate commerce, see the authoritative series of articles by Professor
Thomas R. Powell, commencing in (1918) 31 HAv. L. REv. 572, and New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of N. J., 280 U. S. 338, 50 Sup. Ct. I
(1929).
For other phases of this problem see Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S.
473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (925), and Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup.
Ct. 436 (1930).
'Society for Savings v. Coite, supra note 5.
=oHamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, supra note 5.
"Supra note 5.
'Supra note 5.
"Supra note 5.
" 134 U. S. 594, IO Sup. Ct. 593 (889) (held valid-tvo justices dissenting
-a tax upon corporate "franchise or business" measured by the extent of dividends partially based on earnings from federal bonds).
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The next significant decision squarely raising the problem was
United States v. Perkins,15 upholding a state succession tax on the
value of an estate which included a legacy to the federal government.
The gist of the opinion is in the following excerpt:
"Certainly, if it be true that the right of testamentary disposition is purely statutory, the State has a right torequire a contribution to the public treasury before the bequest shall take effect.
Thus the tax is not upon the property, in the ordinary sense of
the term, but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not until it
has yielded its contribution to the State that it becomes the property of the legatee...
. This, therefore, is not a tax upon the
property itself, but is merely the price exacted by the State for the
privilege." 16
It would appear that the only true conclusion from the premise that
testamentary disposition is a privilege created by the State, is that the
State can tax that privilege; it does not logically follow from the
existence of a state privilege that this particular tax is "thus" or
"therefore" a tax upon it. That the tax is paid before the property
becomes the legatee's, can at most mean that if it is the property which
is being taxed, it is not the legatee's property; the writer fails to see
a difference between property which has "yielded its contribution to
the State", and property which has been taxed. The true holding of
this case is that the tax was not upon the property of the legatee (the
United States) and therefore not upon a federal instrumentality; its
feeble efforts to distinguish between the subject and measure of taxation hardly warrants its citation in support of that distinction in subsequent decisions.
In Plummer v. Coler,'7 holding that a state inheritance tax may
be collected on the total value of an estate which includes United States
bonds without deducting the bonds, no attempt was made to inquire
into the problem anew. The Court merely adhered to the authority
of the preceding cases. It is surprising, however, that the following
language creeps into the opinion: The "effect of this special tax is to
take from the property a portion, or percentage of it, for the use of the
State, and I think it quite immaterial whether the tax can be precisely classified with a taxation of property or not". 8 In this casual
aside one finds more than casual interest: "It may be opportune to
mention that . . . the existence of legislation, whether state or federal, including federal securities as part of the mass of private property subject to inheritance taxes, has not practically injured or im3163

U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. lO73 (1896)1 (one justice dissenting).

See

Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, 23 Sup. Ct. 803 (1903).
" Supra note 15 at 628, 629, 16 Sup. Ct. at 1074.

17178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (19oo)
(one justice dissenting).
Greiner
v.
Lewellyn,
258
U.
S.
384,
42 Sup. Ct. 324 (1921).
"8Supra note 17 at 131, 20 Sup. Ct. at 835.

See

NOTES

paired the borrowing power of the government".10 Thus, the opinion
not only regards for the moment the federal agency as the subject of
the tax, but also inquires into the practical effect of such taxation.
Although this case observes the distinction between the subject and
measure of a tax, it does so only in form-not in substance.
Flint v. Stonw Tracy Co., 20 later to be hailed 21 as "the extreme
example" of the distinction, sustained a federal tax on corporations
measured by their net incomes as a franchise tax. The Court had its
back to the legal wall; if it was to sustain the tax at all, it was compelled by Pollock z,. Fariers'Loan & Trust Co.2 2 to sustain it as a
franchise tax and not as an income tax. The history of federal income
tax legislation was proof of the need for such taxation, and in the face
of this fact it would have been an absurdity for the Court to discard
at that time a distinction which could at last serve a worthy purpose.
Since, however, to save the tax it had to be regarded as a tax on the
franchise merely measured by the income, then it followed necessarily
that income from otherwise exempt state securities was not entitled
to deduction from the measure of the tax-and the Court so held as a
means to that end.
Consideration of further decisions brings one down to the
last decade. The reasoning in Federal Land Bank v. Crosland 3 is
terse-too terse, if there is such a thing as a distinction between subject and measure: "The State is not bound to furnish a registry [for
mortgages including those executed under the Federal Farm Loan
Act], but if it sees fit to do so it cannot use its control as a means to
impose a liability that it cannot impose directly. .

.

. The statute

says that the lender must pay the tax [for the privilege of registry],
but whoever pays it it is a tax upon the mortgage"

24

.

.

.

It is

submitted that this is in accord with the view taken above of United
States v. Perkins, rather than with the language of the Court in that
case.
In Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v,. Wisconsin, 25
where an "annual license tax" was required of corporations amounting
to three per cent. of their gross income, the Court makes a significant
statement: that the very tax had been held a privilege tax or excise in a
previous decision 20q "But no question was then raised concerning
taxation of income derived from United States bonds. The point now
"Supra note 17 at 138, 20 Sup. Ct. at 838.
M220 U S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1910).
See Stratton's Independence, Ltd.,
v. Hawbert, 23i U. S. 399, 414, 34 Sup. Ct. 377 (1913).
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 62o, 628, 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 434
(1929).
2

158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 912 (1895).
U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385 (1922).
"Supra note 23 at 378, 43 Sup. Ct. at 387.
'261

275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55 (1927).
:' Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 38
Sup. Ct. 444 (1918).
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presented was not involved." 27 This is the first clear suggestion, in
any decision, that as one of the factors in determining whether a tax
is on a privilege or on property the Court may take into consideration
the nontaxable nature of the property which is made the "measure" of
the tax. This is a far cry from the reasoning of the cases which had
created the distinction; those cases regarded the nontaxability of the
measure as a reason for applying the distinction,-not as a reason for
interpreting the tax as in fact upon the property used as the measure.
Nevertheless, the Court purported to apply the old distinction as
before, differentiating, however, an excise measured by net income 28
from one measured by gross income: "Here the statute undertook to
impose a charge of 3 per cent. upon every dollar of interest received
by the Company from United States bonds. So much, in any event,
the State took from these very receipts. This amounts, we think, to
an imposition upon the bonds themselves." 29 If the Court in fact
applied the distinction between subject and measure, it clearly begged
the question: the very issue was whether or not the charge was upon
the interest; the conclusion flowed from a premise itself in dispute.
In Panhandle Oil Co. v. Kizox 30 the Court makes short shrift of
the distinction, concerning itself solely with the assertion that "To use
the number of gallons sold the United States as a measure of the
privilege tax is in substance and legal effect to tax the sale" 31 .
and therefore to tax the United States. Here at last the Court regards
it as immaterial that the tax is levied on a taxable subject; the tax is
declared invalid because of the nontaxable nature of the measure. 32
The stage was now set for Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts.
Here was squarely raised the question whether, under a state statute
making net income the measure of a corporate franchise tax, income
from federal securities could be included in the computation. The
Court was at a parting of the ways: on the one extreme-to follow
the logic of the Panhandle opinion and thereby cast into the category
of expressly overruled cases Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. and its progenitors, reduce to a historical whisper the once-ruling language of many
decisions, and suddenly deprive forty-nine governments of a source of
income; on the other extreme-to hark back to the Flint case and
thereby stamp with approval the historical distinction which was now
obviously in disrepute if not already in discard. The Court skilfully
created for itself what appeared a middle path, by an opinion which
sought to confine the decision to the special facts surrounding the
Massachusetts statute at issue. The following sentence is the core of
the opinion: "The fact that a tax ostensibly laid upon a taxable subSupra note 25 at 140, 48 Sup. Ct. at 56.
.' Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra note 20.
' Supra note 25 at 141, 48 Sup. Ct. at 57.
0277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 4.51 (1928) (four justices dissenting on the
ground that both the subject and the measure were taxable).
3' Supra note 30 at 222, 48 Sup. Ct. at 453.
2279 U. S. 620, 48 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929)
(three justices dissenting).
21

NOTES

ject is to be measured by the value of a nontaxable subject at once
suggests the probability that it was the latter rather than the former
that the law-maker sought to reach." 33 Prior cases which had sustained taxation by applying the distinction are differentiated in this one
statement: "It is implicit in all that the thing taxed in form was in
fact and reality the subject aimed at, and that any burden put upon
the nontaxable subject by its use as a measure of value wis fortuitous
and incidental." 3- Thus, the Court takes the view that where the doctrine of Miller v. Milwaukee3 applies, the distinction between the
subject and measure of taxation does not apply-that where in fact
the legislature intends that the so-called nontaxable measure shall
really be the subject of the tax, the Court need not concern itself with
applying the distinction (which by hypothesis requires a tarable subject). This reasoning in itself is no new departure: every question of
statutory interpretation requires of course some search for the legislative aim or intent. In the early cases, the question for the Court
was whether the tax was intended to be on the franchise or on the
property, and this question was decided on purely formal grounds;
thereafter, application of the distinction followed as of course. Here,
the question, though now expressed as whether the tax is intended to
be on the "measure" or on the "subject", is nevertheless the same; but
the crux of the case is that for the second time 30 the Court in terms
considers the nature of the measure in determining what is the subject
of the tax,--substantiating its result by the history of the Massachusetts statute, and at the same time drawing therefrom the desired (and
necessarily narrow) mode of differentiating the Flint case. The writer
once more submits that the early cases regarded the nature of the
measure as the reason for applying the distinction,-rather than the
reason for determining whether the tax was upon the property or
upon the franchise. That the latter approach is quite different from
the former was manifested in the Macallen case, where such a consideration of the nature of the measure became the reason for ignoring
the distinction.
The recent decision of Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,3 7 sustaining a corporate franchise tax measured by net income including
royalties from copyrights, at first seems a sharp volte-face by the
Court. The major portion of the opinion apparently reincarnates the
' Supra note 32 at 629, 48 Sup. Ct. 435.
31Supra note 32 at 628, 48 Sup. Ct. at 434.
2272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280 (1927). In this case, that corporations did

not have to pay a tax upon income received from U. S. bonds was met in the
laws of Wisconsin by a provision that if only part of the inconie of a corporation was assessed, only a corresponding part of the dividends received therefrom
should be deducted from the income taxed to the shareholders. The tax was declared unconstitutional as "an intentional interference that is only prevented

from being direct by the artificial distinction between a corporation and its

members".
' The first reference is in the Northwestern Mutual case, supra note 26.
751 Sup. Ct. 17o (1931)
(three justices dissenting).
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Spirit of '67; the cases which illustrate the distinction in form or in
substance are veritably put on parade. But then:
"This court . . . is not intent upon a mechanical applica-

tion of the rule that government instrumentalities are immune
from taxation, regardless of the consequences to the operations
of government.

.

. . Having in mind the end sought, we can-

not say that the rule applied by this court for some seventy years,
that a nondiscriminatory tax upon corporate franchises is valid,
notwithstanding the inclusion of tax exempt property or income in
the measure of it, has failed of its purpose, or has worked so badly
as to require a departure from it now, or that the present tax,
viewed in the light of actualities, imposes any such. real or direct
burden on the federal government as to call for the application of
a different rule." 31
Thus, once again the Court considers the nature of the measure-not
in order to apply the distinction as a matter of course, but in order to
determine whether or not the distinction is applicable; and the Court
feels that, viewed in the light of actualities, this case is a proper one
in which to apply the distinction. This is a marked advance over the
attitude taken in Long v. Rockwood," which held royalties from patents immune from state taxation for reasons legalistic 40 rather than
realistic.
It is especially interesting to note that the Court makes but slight
effort to defend the historic distinction per se:
"It is said that there is no logical distinction between a tax
laid on a proper object of taxation, measured by a subject-matter
which is immune, and a tax of like amount imposed directly on
the latter; but it may be said with greater force that there is a
logical and practical distinction between a tax laid directly upon
all of any class of government instrumentalities, which the Constitution impliedly forbids, and a tax such as the present, which
can in no case have any incidence, unless the taxpayer enjoys a
privilege which is a proper object of taxation, and which would
not be open to question if its amount were arrived at by any other
nondiscriminatory method." 41
This is not a convincing argument; it amounts only to this: where the
distinction is applied, the state can levy a nondiscriminatorytax on a
federal instrumentality if the taxpayer enjoys some taxable privilege.
The writer feels that the very virtue of the Court's argument lies in
its silent refusal to defend the logic of the distinction; the opinion
Ibid. at i73 (italics not in opinion).
U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928) (four justices dissenting).
0
' See Note (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115.
"Supra note 37 at 173.
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drives home that if the distinction is to be maintained, its sole justification must be in "the end sought". In summary and conclusion:
i. Is the subject taxable?
This was the approach to the problem in the early cases which
established and adhered to the distinction between the subject and
measure of taxation. An earnest effort was made to determine whether
the tax was on a proper subject, i. e., whether it was on a franchise
or on property constituting a governmental instrumentality; the main
tests applied were formal ones, inquiring into the description of the
tax and whether any necessary relation existed between the measure of
the tax and the actual value of the property constituting the measure.
The cases gradually lost sight of such reasoning; but until after the
Flint case if the subject was taxable, the distinction applied automatically and the tax was sustained, regardless of the measure.
Is either the subject or the measure a governmental instrumentality?
This became the question in the later cases, which purported to
adhere to the distinction in the same manner as the early decisions but
in fact made no effort to ascertain the subject of the tax. The reasoning is that if in any degree the tax affected governmental instrumentalities, it should be declared invalid.
2.

3. Is the subject or the measure a governmental instrunentalitywhich
is burdened by the tax?
The most recent cases have definitely abandoned the inflexibility
of the previous lines of reasoning. The main consideration is the
practical effect of using a nontaxable element as the measure of a tax.
Thus, the Macallen case, which clearly regarded governmental operations as burdened 42 by the statutory measure, considered the nature of
this measure as weighty evidence that the tax was in reality upon an
improper subject; therefore the distinction between subject and measure was held inapplicable and the tax was held invalid. On the other
hand, the Court in the Educational Films decision, seeing no burden
imposed on the activities of the federal government by a tax on income
from copyrights, found that the tax was upon a proper subject; this
rendered the distinction applicable and the tax valid.
' Supra note 32. The Court at various times refers to the tax as "subversive" of federal powers, as "likely to impose an injurious burden" upon federal

securities, as "quite analogous" to the tax in Miller v. Milwaukee, as "in derogation of the constitutional power of Congress to borrow money". The dissenting justices, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone,
made the same inquiry as to the burdensome nature of the tax, but reached a
quite different conclusion, favoring "a practical construction which permits both
[national and state goverments] to .function". These justices, together with
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice McReynolds,
constitute the majority in Educational Films Corp. v. Ward.
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The writer submits therefore that fundamentally the Macallen
case and the EducationalFilms case are reconcilable as actual illustrations of the application of the same approach to the problem. The last
word of the Court discloses a search for "actualities", and a willingness
to reach that goal even if a legal fiction-the old distinction between
subject and measure-is necessary. It will therefore be interesting to
await another case in which federal securities are used in the measure
of a state tax. In such a case 43 the writer believes that the Court
should consider anew whether a nondiscriminatory tax upon governmental securities actually does burden the operations of government.
In the last century the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland may have
been carried too far; Chief Justice Marshall's fears may have proved
in some respects groundless. It is the governmental instrumentality
doctrine, and the theory that the power to tax is the power to destroy,
which gave rise to the distinction. If the course of time has proved
that in mutual exemptions "the advantage of the one would be gained
only at the expense of the other",4" and that "the power to tax is not
the power to destroy while this Court sits"

45

-then reason should no

longer be sacrificed at the shrine of stare decisis, and logical illogicality
shquld no longer be the means of reaching the end sought.
H.P.

THE ADOPTION OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: (I) THE CIVIL STATUS OF A FOREIGN CORPoRATIN-A cen-

tury ago, Chief Justice Taney said:
"A corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in
'The writer feels that the attitude of the majority of the justices who decided Educational Films Corp. v. Ward compels the conclusion that the tax will
be sustained. Apparently the only question is whether it will be sustained by
emphasis upon a formal application of the distinction between subject and measure, or by emphasis upon failure of the tax actually to burden governmental
operations. No matter which reasoning is applied, the Macallen case must be
departed from to some extent. That the latter rationale should be chosen is
strongly indicated in Alward v. Johnson, decided by a unanimous court February 24th, 1931 (5I Sup. Ct. 273), where a tax on franchises and property of
automotive transportation lines measured by gross receipts was sustained without deduction or exemption for property used in or revenue derived from carrying U. S. mails. Compare the Panhandle Oil case, supra note 30, the North-

western Mutual decision, supra note 25, and New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v.
State Board of N. J., supra note 8.
' Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, supra
note 32.

" Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, supra note
See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey Bell Telephone
Co. v. State Board of N. J., supra note 8: "I do not think names of any importance in this case, and do not discuss whether the tax is to be called a property tax upon an easement, a franchise tax, . . . a license tax, or by some
30.

other title. .

.

. 'Even interstate commerce must pay it way'."

NOTES

contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that
law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation
can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation
and can not migrate to another sovereignty." '
This geographical theory of the nonexistence of a corporation in
foreign states, known in international law as the restrictive theory 2
because it tends to restrict and confine corporations to the state of
origin, has remained unshaken in our law for a hundred years; even
today courts declare that a corporation exists only within the territorial limits of the state whose law gave it birth. 3 Yet corporations
experience no real difficulty in establishing what appears to be an
actual existence in states wherein theoretically they do not exist; they
sue and are sued, contract, do business, and own property in foreign
states. While courts have consistently confirmed the doctrine that a
corporation, being a mere creature of the law that clothed it with
legal personality, has no existence where its creative law is without
effect, they have with equal unanimity sanctioned and even protected
its practical, if not theoretical, existence outside the boundaries of the
state of origin. The explanation of the divergence here between fact
and theory is a century of economic and social progress; and the history of the law of foreign corporations is a restatement of continued
evasion and circumvention through a fictional technique, of the traditional doctrine enunciated by Taney. This note will confine itself to a
consideration of this and other alleged underlying theories of, and certain fundamental problems arising in connection with, the civil status
of a foreign corporation. 4
A. POWER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO SUE
i. In the FederalCourts.
The first departute from the logical application of the traditional
theory was the recognition accorded, in Bank of the United States v.
1 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 3 Pet. 519, at 588 (1839).
'YOUNG, FOREIGN COMPANIES AND OTHER CORPORATIONS (1912)
' See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 77 U. .28, 20 Sup. Ct.

24.

28 (1oo);
Bacon v. Reserve Bank, 289 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922) ; Caceres v. Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 299 Fed. 968 (D. C. N. Y. 1924); Gorman v.
Leach, ii F. (2d) 454 (D. C. N. Y. 1926); Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Duty, 140
Ark. 135, 215 S.W. 715 (1919) ; Griffiths v. Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232
Pac. 254 (1925); Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. O5, 227 Pac. 582
(1924); Turner v. Turner Mfg. Co., 184 Wis. 5o8, 199 N. W. i55 (1924). In
I FLETCHER, CoRPoRATrIONs (1917) § 387, after repeating Taney's classic statement quoted in the text the author adds, "The law on the subject, as it is generally accepted today, is laid down in the words quoted." See also, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIoN LAW (1930) § 285.
' This note is to be followed by a note in the June, 1931, issue of the U. oF
PA. LAW REV., dealing with the functional capacity of foreign corporations.
Together, the notes present the thesis that the restrictive theory has been wholly
repudiated, except in language, and replaced by the so-called liberal theory of
foreign corporations.
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Dcvcauxr,5 to the right of a corporation to sue in the federal courts of
foreign states under the diversity of citizenship clause. This recognition of a corporation's power to sue outside of the territorial limits of
the creating state, while apparently in conflict with its theoretical inability to exist or act beyond those limits, was ingeniously explained
by the Supreme Court, in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,6 thirty years
later, on the ground that despite a corporation's definitive nonexistence
in foreign states, it might act therein by means of agents. The difficulty with this theory is that if the corporation, the principal, exists
within the contemplation of its creating law only, and is therefore nonexistent where that law ceases to operate, the alleged agent is no
agent, for there can be no agent without a principal.7 By hypothesis,
the principal cannot be the subject of legal relations without the state
of charter; ergo, it cannot have an agent in a foreign state; and even
if by some perversion of logic the corporation's capacity to have an
agent abroad were conceded, the agent, insofar as he attempted to exercise his principal's nonexistent rights, would be legally impotent.
The court did not sense the true nature of the barriers the corporation
must cross to act in a foreign state: they were in fact juridical, and not
merely geographical. For if the premises of the restrictive theory are
valid, it follows that the corporation must be re-creatEd in the foreign
state before it may act or be recognized therein. But such re-creation,
argue the adherents of the restrictive theory, being a sovereign prerogative, may be effected only by the express legislative fiat of the
foreign state; and in the absence of legislative action, there exists no
entity that can sue, do business, or be sued.'
Jurisdiction, in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, was
assumed on a theory of diverse citizenship; but the court, lest a contrary decision permit corporations to claim rights of individual citizens,
particularly those immunities limiting the sovereign power and exclusive jurisdiction of a state over citizens of other states within its
borders arising under the privileges and immunities clause, denied that
a corporation was a citizen, and based its jurisdiction on the citizenship
of the individual members of the corporation by allowing them to
exercise collectively, under a corporate name and in their corporate
capacity, their constitutional right to sue in a federal court. But difficulties arose in the application of this jurisdictional device: if any of
5 Cranch. 6I (i8O9).
173 Pet.
YOUNG,

5ig (1839).
op. cit. supra note 2, at 50.

'Laurent, the Belgian jurist, recognized as the outstanding exponent of the
restrictive theory has thus phrased the concept: "Le legislateur seul a le pouvoir
de creer des personnes juridiques; or, son pouvoir s'arrete a la limite du territoire de ]a nation que lui a delegue la puissance legislative; hors de ces limites,
il n'exerce aucune autorite; donc les corporations, que n'ont d'existence que par
sa volonte, n'existent pas la ou cette volonte est sans force et sans effet."
LAURENT, 4 DROIT CIVIL INTERNATIONAL (1881) 237.
See also, YOUNG, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 27.
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the stockholders were citizens, not of the state of incorporation, but
of the state in which the opposing litigant was a citizen, the basis for
federal jurisdiction disappeared.0 Thus, under this rule, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company would be unable to sue in the federal courts
of any of the forty-eight states. The court then removed, or thought
it removed, these difficulties, by adding to what was already a doubtful
proposition of law the fiction that all the shareholders of t corporation
were conclusively presumed, for purposes of suit, to be citizens of the
chartering state, and that evidence to the contrary was inadmissible.'
Undoubtedly the court felt that both the genius of the constitution
and the exigencies of economic progress demanded that a corporation
be permitted to protect its interests by suing in the federal courts of
foreign states, where, conceivably, access to the state courts may be
denied, and that it be permitted also, when sued in a foreign state by
a resident thereof, to forestall the possible hostility of state courts and
juries, by removing the suit to a federal court. The court, however,
rather than call corporations citizens, preferred to achieve these purposes by perpetrating a wholly tintenable theory, lest, as above indicated, it be forced, by that rule of hermeneutics which limits a word
appearing more than once in a written instrument to a single connotation, to hold that corporations were citizens under the privileges and
immunities clause.". But a corollary to this rule is that if the context
indicates a variant meaning, the indicated variance shall govern. Furthermore, it is believed that the applied, if not expressed, rule of construction in cases where words descriptive of natural persons are used
in a statute, is that corporations shall be held to be within the purview
of the statute if, and only if, inclusion therein is necessary to effectuate
the purpose and meaning of the statute. Under these rules it may
reasonably be held that a corporation is a citizen within Article III,
but not Article IV, of the federal Constitution, since their purposes
and meanings are clearly distinguishable. Fortunately, recent cases
'Commercial and Railroad Bank v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 14 Pet. 6o
(0840). Likewise even though the complaint averred the state of incorporation,

if it failed to allege the citizenship of all the individual shareholders, the pleading was defective, and the court lacked jurisdiction: Sullivan v. Steamboat Co.,
6 Wheat. 450 (1821).

'VMarshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. 314 (1853) ; Ohio & Mississippi
R. R. Co., v. Wheeler, i Black 286 (i86x).
' It is interesting to note, however, that in two successive cases decided several years after the Deveaux case, the court abandoned the theory that a corporation is entitled to diverse citizenship jurisdiction because of the citizenship
of its incorporators, and flatly held that a corporation is a citizen of the state
of charter: Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844); Rundle v.
Canal Co., 14 How. 8o (1852). But it was believed that these cases admitted
corporations to rights not only under the diverse citizenship clause, but also

under the privileges and immunities clause, and the ensuing criticism caused
the court to overrule, in Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., i6 How. 314 (1853),
the theory of the Letson and Rundle cases and re-establish the doctrine of the
Deveaux case.
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indicate12a probable future tendency to dispense with the unnecessary
fiction.
2. In State Courts. Herein of Comnity.
State courts early followed the federal practice and allowed foreign corporations to bring suit therein without reflection, apparently,
of the theoretical impossibility of the corporation's act in the absence
of express legislative action recognizing and thereby re-creating the
corporate entity. For how could a juristic entity, inherently incapable
of migrating from the territory of its sovereign, sue in a court beyond
that territory? And by what means could a court hear a litigant,
whose existence within the contemplation of the law administered by
that court, was definitively impossible? In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,"
the Supreme Court, in acknowledging the validity of suits by corporations in the tribunals of foreign states, raised and answered the questions. It met the geographical objection with the theory of agency set
forth above; and strove to nullify the juridical objection with an
equally nonexplanatory explanation, the doctrine of comity.
The doctrine of comity is that while all laws are limited in their
application to the territory of their sovereign, yet unless they are
opposed to the policy, or antagonistic to the interests, of other sovereigns, the latter, out of international or interstate courtesy and
comity, will recognize and apply these laws. It is therefore presumed,
unless the legislature has expressly negatived the presumption, that a
corporation may, because of comity, enter a foreign state and act
therein with all the rights, privileges and powers of domestic corporations. The acquiescence of the state is presumed from its silence;
only a positive indication will deprive a corporation of a right deriving
its validity from comity. But comity is voluntary, not compulsory;
therefore the state may, at its pleasure, exclude the foreign corporation. Since it may exclude, reasoned the Supreme Court in Paul v.
Virginia,4 it may admit upon any conditions or terms it deems necessary.
The general nature of comity cannot here be discussed, but it is
enough to say that modern authorities on conflict of laws and international law have wholly repudiated the doctrine, maintaining that it
in entirely uninfluential in determining what extraterritorial effect

'See St. Louis v. James, I6I U. S. 545, 16 Sup. Ct. 621 (I896) ; Doctor v.
Harrington, 196 U. S. 579, 25 Sup. Ct. 317 (I9O5).
The text-books and cases
now not infrequently say that a corporation is a citizen under Art. III of the
Constitution, whereas formerly the corporation was said to be deemed a citizen.
But any discussion of the theory of citizenship inevitably evokes a restatement
of "indisputable citizenship." See i FLtrCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 39o, and
cases cited.
"'3 Pet. 519 (1839).
" 8 Wall. I68 (1868).
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shall be extended a given law. 15 Its application to the law of foreigncorporations arose from a fundamental misconception as to the real
nature of a corporation; 16 at most, comity is a conwlusion, not an
explanation.
In the sense that it legalized extraterritorial corporate activity
without legislative recognition by the foreign state, the doctrine of
comity nullified the restrictive theory. It seems clear that the doctrines cannot logically coexist; yet the courts, while recognizing foreign corporations on a theory of comity, have tenaciously clung, at
least verbally, to the restrictive theory in its entirety, maintaining that
even after the corporation is recognized in foreign states by comity, it
nevertheless exists only in the state of origin.-7 But to say that a
corporation exists only in the state of charter, but that it may act and
be recognized in foreign states, seems to the writer a perversion of
language and the simultaneous enunciation of hopelessly irreconcilable
ideas.
Under a cloak of comity, therefore, states may open their courts
to foreign corporate litigants. Likewise under the doctrine, states
may impose conditions, compliance with which shall be a prerequisite
to suit by foreign corporations, or may altogether deny them the aid
of its courts. It seems evident, however, that to allow a state to decide
at its unappealable option whether a foreign corporation may or may
not, and under what conditions, resort to the courts of that state, may
result in serious hardship to the corporation. The trend of modern
business is national, not provincial; and the administration of the vast
volume of business today transacted by corporations in foreign states
would be hampered and burdened were access to the tribunals of these
states dependent on the uncontrolled and often capricious will of the
state."$ Moreover, the right to sue, in final analysis, is but a means of
asserting and enforcing other rights; the deprivation of the right to
sue may render illusory all other rights.
The doctrine of Paul v. Virginia that a state may exclude foreign
corporations, or impose any conditions whatsoever as the price of
admission, does not today seem socially justifiable. The rigid appliSGooDRicH, CoNFucr OF LAWS (1927) 7; DicE-, CONFLICT OF LAws (3d
ed. 1922) 10; WESTLAKE, PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. I912) 22;
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. I93O), § 6. See Francis, Domi-

cile of a Corporation (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 335, at 345.
"aSee Note (June, 1931) Functional Capacity of Foreign Corporations,appearing in the next issue of the RzvImw.
" See cases cited in note 3, supra.
"8See, for example, Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1876) (state expelled
foreign corporation for removing case to federal court) ; Ducat v. Chicago, IO
Wall. 410 (1870) (state imposed 2 per cent. tax on premiums of foreign insurance companies, in addition to general tax imposed on all insurance companies) ;
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. 737 (I888)
(state imposed discriminatory license tax on foreign corporations) ; Hooper v.
California, 155 U. S. 648, I5 Sup. Ct. 207 (895) (state made act of procuring
insurance from foreign insurance company a misdemeanor).
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cation of the doctrine would leave legitimate nationwide enterprise a
prey to the provincialism of every state in which it seeks to do business.
Such indeed was the effect of Paul v. Virginia for a time. 19 But the
imposition of burdensome conditions would of necessity discourage
and curtail the growth of legitimate interstate and national business;
and in the resultant conflict between what the Supreme Court deemed
economic progress, and the plenary power of the state over foreign
corporations, the court invoked the aid of the Constitution to curb the
power of the state.'0 The commerce clause, decided the court, forbade
the state from excluding from its territory foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce, or levying taxes, or imposing conditions,
that unduly burdened the corporation's interstate business. A corporation was then defined as a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thenceforth, when within the foreign state,
might call upon the due process and equal protection of law clauses to
delimit the state's control. The birth and growth of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions furnished yet another means whereby the
power of the state to impose harsh conditions might be cut down.
Under this doctrine a state may not impose unconstitutional conditions
or compel consent thereto as an alternative to exclusion or expulsion
from the state.
The protection thus accorded the constitutional rights of the foreign corporation has been extended of necessity to include immunity
from the state's denial or unreasonable regulation of the corporation's
power to enforce these rights. 2 1 Otherwise the enunciation of the
constitutional guarantees would be but an empty gesture. The case of
Kentucky Finance Corporation v. Paramount Autonobile Exchange
Corporation," decided in 1923, is perhaps the best illustration of the
present attitude of the Supreme Court towards suit by corporations in
the tribunals of foreign states. A Kentucky corporation, not doing,
nor authorized to do, business in Wisconsin, sued in a Wisconsin court
to recover an automobile stolen from it in Kentucky. The corporation
was ordered to send its secretary to Wisconsin for adverse examinaSee cases cited in note I8 supra, each of which upheld the plenary power
of the state to deal with the foreign corporation. It is notable in tracing the
development of the law of foreign corporations, that all four cases cited have
since been respectively overruled: Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42
Sup. Ct. 188 (1922) ; Southern R. R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct.
287 (igio) ; ibid.; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
' The present Constitutional protection afforded foreign corporations will
be more fully discussed in Note (June, 1931) Functional Capacity of Foreign
Corporations,appearing in the next issue of the RxwlEW.
"Cases illustrating this line of reasoning, in addition to the Paramount
case cited in the text, are those holding that the right to maintain suits arising
out of interstate commerce is inseparable from the right to do interstate business: International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481
(igio); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57 (914);
Furst v. Brewster, 51 Sup. Ct. 295 (1931).
=262 U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636.

NOTES

tion before proceeding further with the suit. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin had previously declared the statute under which the examination was ordered to be inapplicable under similar circumstances to
non-resident natural persons. The corporation, alleging the unconstitutionality of the statute, refused to submit to the examination, whereupon the trial court dismissed the case, and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal.2 3 On appeal, the federal Supreme Court
reversed the state tribunal, holding that the statute discriminated without cause between foreign corporations and other nonresidents thereby
unconstitutionally denying to the former equal protection of law. The
plaintiff, it added, by coming into the state to sue became a person
within the jurisdiction and therefore entitled to the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, however, the law of the state
allowed foreign corporations not doing business to sue in its courts.
Suppose now that by statute such corporations were barred absolutely
from the state courts: would the Supreme Court have decided that a
corporation merely coming into a state to maintain a forbidden suit
was a person within the jurisdiction? And would the court hold that
the denial of the courts to the corporation was unconstitutional? The
opinion does not expressly treat of these questions. Yet it is difficult
to infer anything but an affirmative answer from the following language in the decision:
"To have denied that right [to sue] would in effect have
deprived the plaintiff of its property and have been an intolerable
injustice. That the plaintiff owed its corporate existence to Kentucky did. not enable Wisconsin to treat its plight with indifference." 24
In either event there is a vast difference between the spirit manifest in these words and the attitude of the court who said in Paul v.
Virginia;
"[The corporation] having no absolute right of recognition
in other states but dependent for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon their assent, it follows as a matter of
course that such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions the state may think proper to impose..

matter rests in their discretion."

.

The whole

25

The provincialism which once dictated the law of foreign corporations seems dying fast; and it were better so. Under Kentuckv
Finance Corporationv. Paramount Automobile Corporation,it would
171 Wis. 586, 178 N. W. 9 (192o).
'Supra note 22, at 550, 43 Sup. Ct. at 638.

2

18 Wall. 168, at 181 (i868).
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seem that even though, as other cases have held, 26 a state may bar a
foreign corporation from doing business therein, it may not deny or
unreasonably regulate legitimate resort to its courts. A distinction
such as this is profoundly logical. The doing of business within a
state may affect its public policy and social interests; and it is well that
a state should control fully any factor that may prove inimical to its
welfare. But no such disturbance of social interests attaches to the
bringing of suit. If anything, public policy would dictate that free
access to the courts be an unquestioned privilege of all proper suitors,
citizen and noncitizen, resident and nonresident, alike. A court of law
is civilization's method for arbitrating private disputes, a method whose
only alternative is force. To deprive a sufficiently large group of
rightful access to law courts is to destroy the basic pillar upon which
modern society rests.
B.

THE SUABILITY OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION

i. In General.
With the growth of extraterritorial corporate business came the
inevitable problem of whether a corporation could be subjected to suit
in personam within a foreign state. The early view 27 denied such
suability since by hypothesis the corporation was absent from the foreign state and could not be served therein. But the centralization of
vast corporate interests in nonchart~ring states, and the increased recognition and protection therein accorded foreign corporations rendered
intolerable their immunity from local suit. Since it was generally
believed that the common law knew no method whereby the foreign
corporation could be served, statutes were passed providing for suit
against, and process of service on, such corporations doing business
within the state. -8 The validity of the statutes was considered for
the first time by the Supreme Court in Lafayette Insurance Company
v. French,2" in 1855, and the court sustained their constitutionality.
Since that decision, the amenability of a corporation to service and suit
within a foreign state in which it does business has never been doubted
despite constant restatement of the corporation's nonexistence therein.
The doctrine was recently re-enunciated in Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 51 Sup. Ct. 2Ol (1931). See BALLANTINE, 10c. cit. supra note 3, and
cases cited.

'

HENDERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMErIcAie
TUTIONAL LAW (I918) 79 et seq.

CONSTI-

' The first of these statutes was enacted in Florida in 1829. Other states
quickly followed suit, and practically all today have such statutes. See Cahill,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1917) 3o HARV. L. REv. 676, 690. It
is interesting to note however that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1827,
in Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. & R. 173, had suggested that a

foreign corporation might be served wherever it did business, even in the absence
of statute, and that New Hampshire, in 1838, in Libbey v. Hodgdon, 9 N. H.
394, had allowed service on, and suit against, a foreign corporation although a
statute providing for such service was lacking.
- 18 How. 404.

NOTES
2. Under the JudiciaryAct of 1789.

An interesting development of another situation in which the
corporation was first regarded as without, and later as within, the
foreign state, is presented in the history of the enabling Judiciary Act
of 1789, which gave effect to the diverse citizenship clause. As originally enacted in 1789 1o it limited suits brought in the circuit courts to
districts wherein the defendant was an "inhabitant" or could be
"found". Erly cases, logically following the classical theory laid
down by Taney and Marshall, held that a corporation could not be
sued in foreign states, because, having no existence beyond the territorial limits of the state of origin, it could not be an "inhabitant" of,
or "found" in, other states. 31 These early decisions, therefore, permitted a corporation to evade suit even in states in which it carried on
business. Such a doctrine was impracticable and unjust in the face of
extensive and increasing extraterritorial corporate business, and the
earlier cases were therefore quickly overruled.3 2 It was then held that
if a corporation did business in a state which provided by statute for
the appointment of an agent to accept service as a condition precedent
to doing business, the corporation thereby consented, despite a theoretical inability, to being "found" in that state, thus establishing the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 3 The doctrine was later extended
to states which had no such statute, the court holding that a corporation was "found" in any state wherein it carried on business, on the
sole basis of its doing such business 4 But the Judicature Act was
amended in 1887 by omitting the "in which he shall be found" clause,
and limiting jurisdiction in diverse citizenship cases, to suits brought
in the district whereof either the plaintiff or defendant was an inhabitant3 5 Under this revision it has been decided that a corporation is
a resident and an inhabitant of only the state of origin.3 6 The law
today, therefore, is that a corporation may be sued in the federal courts
of its chartering state only by a nonresident, and in the federal courts
of other states, if doing business therein, only by a resident. Furthermore even if suit against the foreign corporation is commenced in a
state court, the corporation may, against the wishes of the plaintiff,
remove the suit to a federal court.3 7 Whether a corporation may be
0Act
'

of Sept. 24,

1789, c. 20, § II, I STAT. 79.

Day v. Mfg. Co., i Blatch. 628 (i85o) ; Pomeroy v. R. R. Co., 4 Blatch.

120 (1857).

Infra note 33, 34.
12 Wall. 65 (I87O) ; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96
U. S. 369 (3877).
'Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 8 Biss. 429 (i879) ; Barrow v. Kane, i7o

SR. R. Co. v. Harris,

U. S. 1oo, i8 Sup. Ct. 526 (I898).

'Act of Mar. 3, 1887, c. 373, § I, 24 STAT. 552.

'Er parte Shaw, 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935 (892) ; Seaboard Rice
Milling Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 363, 46 Sup. Ct. 247 (3926).
U Ins. Co. v. Morse, 2o Wall. 445 (3874) ; Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257
U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. I88 (1922).
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sued within a given state, depends on the existence of facts, considered
below, which make the corporation jurisdictionally present within the
state; but even then it cannot be sued in the courts of that state without its consent, since it may, if it chooses, remove the suit.
This power of foreign corporations to sue in, and remove to,
federal courts, has been the subject of prolonged and acrimonious
attack.38 It has been argued that it is unfair to deny to a state power
to adjudicate through its own courts disputes between its own citizens
and foreign corporations doing business in the state and protected by
its laws. It is also said that the supposed basis for diversity jurisdiction, the alleged bias of state courts in favor of their own citizens, iq
today untrue and that it is doubtful if ever it was true.3 9 Furthermore,
diversity jurisdiction has been abused by corporations who incorporate
in states other than the one in which they propose to do business in
order to avoid subjection to its laws. 40 States have therefore attempted to confine litigation involving foreign corporations to the state
courts, and the Supreme Court has uniformly stamped these attempts
as unconstitutional.41 A dictum in a recent case, Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia,42 if understood correctly by the writer, points to
an effective, though constitutional, modus operandi whereby the state
may prevent resort by foreign corporations to federal courts.
3. Theories of Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations.
In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,43 the first case deciding
that a corporation may constitutionally be served in a foreign state
wherein it does business, the court, in sustaining the validity of the
service, adhered to the view that the corporation was absent from the
state, and justified the suit on the ground that the absent defendant
had consented thereto. If a state imposes the condition that a foreign
corporation submit to service within the state as a prerequisite to doing
' Russell, Federal Jurisdiction (1893) 7 HARv.L. REV. x6; Triever, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts (905) 39 Amrm. L. REV. 564; Baldwin, Clipped
Legal Fiction (1907) 41 AmER. L. REv. 38; Friendly, Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HARv.L. REv. 483; Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power (1929) 13 CoRx. L. Q. 499. In U. S. v. Mayor of Hoboken, 29
F. (2d) 932, 933 (D.C. N. J. 1928), it is said: "It seems to this court that the
whole question of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction might profitably be
re-examined and revised to accord with facts rather than with history. A beginning might well be made with foreign corporations where two fictions added
together result in transferring the prejudice to the federal courts themselves."
'See Frankfurter; Friendly; both supra note 38.
" See, for example, Black and White Taxi Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi
Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).
" A discussion of these cases, including the Railway Express Agency case
cited in the text, will be found in Note (June, 1931) Functional Capacity of
Foreign Corporations,appearing in the next issue of the REVIEW.
'51 Sup. Ct. 201 (1931).
0s 18 How. 404 (1855).

NOTES

business, it is presumed, said the court,44 that the corporation, by doing
business therein, consents to the exercise of jurisdiction. It has been
argued, nofably by Beale, 5 that .this consent is real; and for many
years jurisdiction over the foreign corporation doing business was
upheld on this theory of implied consent by the absent defendant.
Yet the theory is untenable. Frequently such consent, either subjectively or objectively, does not exist, yet jurisdiction has been assumed and sustained. For example, the lack of statutory provisions
authorizing the suit will not defeat such assumption of jurisdiction,
although it is difficult to understand how the corporation can consent
to a statutory condition of admission where there is no statute. Yet
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane," upheld the corporation's suability
despite the absence of the enabling statute. Furthermore, if such
consent were real, then the statute would be valid even though it provided for a mode of service otherwise deemed not due process. But
the Supreme Court, in a number of decisions, has placed limitations
upon the jurisdiction. St. Clair v. CoX 47 laid down the rule, thenceforth to be undeviatingly followed, that a foreign corporation may not
be sued in states in which it is not "doing business", and Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Spratley48 added the requirement that process
must be served upon an agent of the corporation so representative in
character that his power to accept service could be implied therefrom.
In ConsolidatedFlourMills Company v. Muegge," the Supreme Court
declared that a statute authorizing service upon a public official was
invalid if it did not require the official to notify the corporation of such
service. And "consent" to service upon a statutory agent, it was held
in Simon v. Southern Railway Company," does not extend to causes
of action whose locus is beyond the state. But if the corporation files
a written, and therefore actual, consent to service upon the public
official, as was done in Pennsylvania FireInsuranwe Company v. Gold
Issue Mining Company,- such consent is limited only by the terms
of the written document, and may therefore include foreign causes of
action.
"Ibid. at 408.
'BEALE; FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (195o)
§266: "Since consent is given by
acts, not by mere words, this implied consenit is as real as consent expressed by

spoken or written words. Not the words themselves but the act of speaking or
writing them, is the legal consent; and the act of doing business in acceptance
of a conditional offer is equally an act of consent to the terms of the offer thus
accepted."
" Supra note 34.
'7

io6 U.

S. 350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354 (1882).

' 172 U. S.
9278

602, 19

Sup. Ct. 308 (I898).

U. S. 559, 49 Sup. Ct. 17

(1928) rezlg 127

Okla.

:295,

26o Pac. 745 on

authority of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928).
&0236U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (1915).
"243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344 (1917).

968

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

In reality, there is no consent; and in Flexner v. Farson 12 and
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company v. Gold Issue Mining Company 53 the Supreme Court admitted that the implied consent is fictitious. But such admission is an avowal, unless some other basis for
jurisdiction is found, of the controversion of the constitutional limitation that an absent defendant may not be served without his consent.5
Two lines of reasoning sustaining the jurisdiction have been indicated:
that either the corporation is present in a state in which it does business
and may therefore be served there, or that underlying this assumption
of jurisdiction is some basis other than consent which constitutionally
justifies suit against an absent defendant.
With but few exceptions, recent writers have decried the theory
that the corporation is present wherever it does business. 55 It is
argued that the word is inaccurately used because a person is not present in a state simply because he does business there. Conversely, a
person is present where his body is; and a corporation can never be
present in this sense. The word presence, as used to denote a function
of natural persons, it is said, either has no meaning or is but a metaphor when applied to juristic persons. 5 It is also argued 57 that the
"presence" theory does not explain the jurisdiction assumed in such
cases as American Railway Express Company v. Royster Guano Company 18 which hold that even though the corporation ceases to do business, withdraws from the state, and revokes its designation of a statutory agent to receive process, the corporation is nevertheless liable
therein for causes of action arising from such business, and that its
revocation of agency is ineffective as to such causes. Such criticism,
the writer believes, is unsound; it is based upon what later will be
shown to be a fundamental misconception of corporate presence.
Accordingly, theorists and courts who have rejected the "presence" doctrine have advanced other theories, all based on the absence
of the defendant foreign corporation, purporting to explain the juris248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919) : "But the consent that it is said to
be implied in such cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine
that the state could exclude foreign corporations altogether, and could therefore
establish this obligation as a condition to letting them in."
Supra note SI, at 96, 37 Sup. Ct. at 345: "This consent is a mere fiction
*
. . adopted to reconcile the intimation with general rules of jurisdiction."
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
The theory has been advocated by GoomlcH, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1927)
149; HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 27, at 98; Cahill, loc. cit. supra note 28.
Contra: Magruder and Foster, Turisdiction over Partnerships (1924) 37 HARV.
L. REV. 793; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (925) 39 HARV.
L. REv. 563 (1925); Fead, Jurisdictim over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24
MICH. L. REv. 633; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 882; Francis, Domicile of a Corporation (1028) 38 YALE L. J. 335; Note (1929) 29 COL. L. Rnv. 187; Foster, Place
of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 1231; BALLANTINE, op. Cit.
supra note 3, § 291.
"Scott, supra note 55, at 576.
' Fead, supra note 55, at 636.
58273 U. S. 274, 47 Sup. Ct. 355 (1927).

NOTES

diction imposed.

One favored theory was first propounded in Smolik

v. Philadelphia& Reading Coal Company " by Judge Learned Hand,

who declared that while the corporation may not have actually consented to the assumption of jurisdiction, nevertheless it will be treated,
for purposes of justice, as though it had. But to regard a corporation
as consenting, when in fact it has not, is to decide a constitutional question by means of a fiction; and it is now well settled that in the interpretation and construction of constitutional provisions, fictions may
not be employed."0 This theory, it would therefore seem, does not
satisfactorily supply the formula sought for.
Another explanation, styled by its creator the "submission" theory,(' is that the corporation by doing business within the state submits
to jurisdiction therein. At this theory may be leveled criticism equally
applicable to the consent doctrine: the corporation will be subjected to
suit whether it submits or consents or not. The theory is therefore
believed to be inadequate.
More recently it has been proposed that jurisdiction over foreign
corporations arises from the power of the state to exercise jurisdiction
through its courts over any person, natural or artificial, who has done
an act or caused an event within the state, which the latter might constitutionally have forbidden, as to causes of action arising out of such
act or event.62 The writer deems this a sound and justifiable basis
for the assumption of jurisdiction. Nevertheless it is neither existing
law nor a principle thereof. 63 Under this theory the jurisdiction of
the state would extend as to causes of action arising out of isolated
acts by a foreign corporation not doing business therein; and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly and recently denied the power of the
state to exercise such jurisdiction.64 Moreover, the theory leaves
unexplained the subjection, in cases like Reynolds v. Missouri,K. & T.
Railway,"5 of the foreign corporation to liability within the state for
causes of action arising from business not done therein. Nor is it a
satisfactory basis for the jurisdiction assumed, in cases like International Harvester Company v. Kentucky,' over a foreign corporation
Fed. 149 (D. C. N. Y. I915).
' "The Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction.' Holmes, $., in
Hyde v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347, 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, 794 (1917).
Fead, supra note 55, at 636.
Scott supra note 55, at 572.
The theory, however, has been adopted as a basis of jurisdiction over individuals by the CoNFucT oF LAws REsTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) §§ go, 91.
"Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 49 Sup. Ct. 360
W222

(1929).

See

BALLANTINE,

op. cit. supra note 3, § 291 and cases cited.

a255 U. S. 565, 41 Sup. Ct. 376 (i921).
6'234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944 (1914).
Likewise, even though a state may
not constitutionally forbid an insurance company from continuing existing policies, Provident Savings Assn. v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 34
(1915), it may assume jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of such
policies, Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 6o2, 19 Sup. Ct. 308 (1899). See
Bullington, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1927) 6 N. C. L. REv. 147,
at 155.
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doing interstate business, since here the corporation is subject to jurisdiction within the state as to acts the state may not constitutionally
forbid. The adoption of the doctrine, however, seems desirable in
that it would obviate the injustice apparent in such cases as Rosenberg
Bros. v. Curtis Brown Company,6 7 where the corporation resists the
state's jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a contract
consummated therein, on the plea it was not "doing business" and
therefore not subject to suit within the state. Nevertheless the theory
seems limited in present law to the factual situation of Hess v. Pawloski," which involved the doing of a dangerous act.
There remains, however, to illuminate the assumption of the
jurisdiction the hypothesis, referred to above, that the corporation, by
doing business within the state, is present therein. The theory was
enunciated as long ago as 1838 by the New Hampshire Court in Libbey
v. Hodgdon.69 But it was impossible for the Supreme Court in its
first judicial determination of the question seventeen years later in
Lafayette Insurance Company v. French"0 to recognize as valid a
doctrine so incompatible with Dartmouth College v. Woodward71 and
Bank of Augusta v. Earle,7 2 " and the presence theory was therefore
rejected in favor of the consent doctrine. But the consent doctrine
has since been repudiated, and language in recent cases reveals the
presence doctrine as the modern Supreme Court explanation for the
73
suability of a foreign corporation in states wherein it does business.
It is submitted that the presence theory is a valid but new head of
jurisdiction. What the Supreme Court has really done has been to
create a new jurisdictional basis which it terms "corporate presence."
But corporate presence, while analogous to individual presence, may
not be identified or confused therewith. "Corporate presence," as
defined, is not the bodily occupation of space, as is individual presence.
For obviously a corporation, being an aggregate, is incapable of such
at26o U. S. 516, 43 Sup. Ct. 170 (1923).
6274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
69 N. H. 394 (1838).
7o 18 How. 404 (1855).
-14Wheat. 5 18 (18ig).
72 13 Pet. 519 (1839).
' McKenna, I., in Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Co., 218 U. S. 573, 584, 31
Sup. Ct. 127, 131 (igio); Day, J., in St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227
U. S. 218, 226. 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 247 (i9io); International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 589, 34 Sup. 944, 946 (1914); People's Tobacco Co.

v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 235 (igi8);
Brandeis, J., in Phila. & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 265, 37 Sup.

Ct. 280, 281 (1917) ; Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 26o U. S. 516, 518,
43 Sup. Ct. 170, 171 (1g23); Bank of America v. Whitney Bank, 261 U. S. 171,
172, 43 Sup. Ct. 311 (1923) ; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S.
333, 335, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 251 (1924) ; Stone, J., in Louisville R. R. v. Chatters,
279 U. S. 320, 49 Sup. Ct. 329 (I929). See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 864; Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REzv. I062, at lO64; Bullington, supra note
66, at 151.
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individual presence. In the sense that the Supreme Court must be
understood as using the concept, corporate presence is the manifestation of a certain quantum of group activity. Today the prescribed
quantum which is the condition precedent to corporate presence is the
elusive factual situation known as "doing business". But "doing business" is not, as has been suggested, the jurisdictional basis ; 7 the basis
is presence, and doing business is merely the present condition precedent thereto.75 Thus, the Supreme Court may tomorrow decide that
the quantum of activity sufficient to support presence shall be the doing
of a single act by an authorized agent on behalf of the corporation;
thereafter, the jurisdictional basis, presence, will be the same, but its
condition precedent will have changed, and the corporation will be
jurisdictionally present when such a single act is done.
Since corporate presence may not be identified with individual
presence, it follows that the legal incidents attached thereto may similarly differ. Furthermore, it is believed that the legal significance of
a given set of facts involving group action may differ from the legal
consequences of the same factual situation when action by individuals
qua individuals is involved.78 A recognition of these facts exposes the
inadequacy of the several criticisms, above enumerated, of the presence
theory; in each case it has been erroneously assumed that the legal
incidents of corporate presence should be similar to those attached to
individual presence. In marking out the limits of the legal consequences flowing from such corporate presence, the Supreme Court has
looked to social and economic expediency; it has disregarded the existence or nonexistence of similar incidents resulting from individual
presence. Thus a corporation may be sued in a state even after withdrawal therefrom, on causes of action arising out of the business previously done therein. 77 Similarly it may not in general even when
present in a state by virtue of doing business, be subjected therein, in
the absence of consent, to suit on foreign causes of action.78 The forFSe Note (1929) i .Hv. L. REv. lO62, at
REsTATEMENT (Am.

L. Inst.

1930)

§ 98.

1O65;
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' In the light of the language used in the cases cited in note 73 supra, the
conclusion, to the writer, seems irresistible. A common statement is that the
foreign corporation is subject to suit "if it is doing business within the state in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present
there."
"'For example, a contract made on behalf of a purported, but nonexistent
principal, cannot be ratified by the principal when he comes into existence; but
a contract made on behalf of a prospective corporation may be ratified or
"adopted" by the corporation after its formation. See i MEcHEm, AGENCY
(2d ed. 1914) 276.
'Amer. Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U. S. 274, 47 Sup. Ct.
388 (1927); Zendle v. Garfield Aniline Works, 29 F. (2d) 415 (D. C. N. J.
1928).
"Davis v. Farmers Coop. Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556 (923);
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207 (1929) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 Sup. Ct. 329 (1929).
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mula to be sought in each case is one which affords protection without
molestation to the foreign corporation, and protection without prejudice to the residents of states in which the corporation does business.
The incidents themselves have neither been definite nor constant. 9
Such uncertainty is undesirable; social expediency is of itself too vague
a guide for either the predetermination or adjudication of cases involving the nation's business and its pre-eminent mechanism for the
transaction of such business. It is probable, however, that the next
two decades will see the formulation into crystallized rules of the
principles governing the jurisdiction of the state over foreign corporations doing business within its borders.
W.B.R.
"Supra note 16.

